Peircean abduction and the relation of probability between characteristics

Abstract

This paper aims to defend the definition of abduction as a relation of probability between characteristics. Peirce and his commentators usually argue that such a characteristic of abduction would not match the concept of abduction presented by the American philosopher. However, this paper will argue that this is not so. Instead, the relation of probability could have a role in the selection of hypotheses, thus being a part of the abduction inference. To defend this idea, a basic definition of abduction will be presented. After that, the proposal that abduction is a relation of probability between characteristics will be shown, as exposed by Peirce. Then, the criticism of this proposal will be presented. Finally, it will be argued that this criticism cannot be sustained in the light of the Peircean concept of abduction. Thus, the possibility that the relation of probability would be a characteristic of the Peircean abduction remains.