Selective realism, constructive empiricism and the problem of theoretical continuity

Abstract

Throughout the debate on scientific realism, some anti-realists, such as Leo Tolstoy and Larry Laudan, have issued a skeptical challenge to realists, questioning, based on the history of science, the realist belief in continuity between past, present, and future theories. Stathis Psillos offered a reply that became known as selective realism or divide et impera, arguing that through careful examination, we can find theoretical elements of continuity between past and present theories, ensuring, by analogy, that future theories will also possess elements of continuity with current ones. Psillos’s strategy, if properly employed, can demonstrate that the realist reading of the history of science also has its virtues and should be considered. However, in this article, we argue that even if Psillos’ selective realism proves to be applicable, it should be considered as a critique of discontinuous conceptions in the history of science and not necessarily of scientific anti- realism in general, since constructive empiricism of Bas van Fraassen, for example, admits theoretical continuity in science.