Rorty’s neopragmatist reading of Foucault

rupture or continuity of the modern view of subjectivity

Abstract

The objective of this research is to investigate Richard Rorty’s (1931-2007) neopragmatist reading of Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) conception of subjectivity. Rorty became known as a famous philosopher who opposed the modern conception of the subject, especially the excess of anthropocentrism and scientism. As for the French philosopher Michel Foucault, we can see in the third domain of his theoretical production, the presence of a vigorous investigation into the constitution of the subject. Initially, we can see from his first writings the role played by power and truth as mechanisms that create subjectivity, imposing on subjects ways of being and relating to themselves and others. However, the analysis of the issue of the constitution of the subject is configured in a more limited way in the courses  Subjectivity and Truth (1981) and The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1982). Foucault develops an investigation into subjectivity based on the notions of ethics, philosophy, spirituality, sexuality, art of living and self-care, seeking to understand how the subject becomes subjected to power and knowledge, suggesting new modes of subjectivity, different from those proposed by power. However, contrary to what Foucault proposed, the neo-pragmatist North American philosopher Richard Rorty, known for proposing an edifying philosophy, states in his work Contingency, irony and solidarity (2007) that the French philosopher's ideas, although they try to free themselves from the modern conception of subjectivity, still remain tied to it. Thus, the research intends to explore the Rorty arguments that justify objections to Foucault and based on the analysis of specific texts by both authors, it seeks to identify the arguments used by Rorty to accuse Foucault of remaining within the theoretical framework of modernity.