From indeterminacy to normativity

Quine, meaning, and teleosemantics

Abstract

The problem of meaning indeterminacy has long challenged philosophers, particularly at the intersection of language, cognition, and epistemology. While teleosemantics offers a promising naturalistic framework by grounding meaning in the evolutionary functions of biological systems, it faces a persistent challenge: how to account for the normative dimensions of meaning — those that make interpretations justifiable rather than merely adaptive. This paper addresses that challenge by integrating insights from Quine’s critique of analyticity and his holistic epistemology with teleosemantic theories developed by Millikan and Papineau. We argue that meaning stabilizes not through formal structures alone, nor through mere causal success, but via historically embedded epistemic practices that reflect a capacity for reflexive self-correction. This reflexivity, we suggest, enables a form of conceptual self-consciousness grounded in our biological background rather than in metaphysical assumptions — thus securing a continuity between empirical inquiry and normative justification. By framing normativity as an emergent property of coordinated, self-aware epistemic communities, the paper challenges reductionist accounts of meaning and advocates for a refined naturalism — one that preserves the critical tension between descriptive success and the evolving standards of rational endorsement.