Pragmatismo e percepção sensorial: é a teoria de Peirce, Dewey e Mead idêntica à de Aristóteles?

Abstract

Even today, sensorial perception is a great philosophic mystery. This work is divided in two parts: The first synthesizes and criticizes the prevailing cerebral representationism model and enunciates an argument that prepares the field to the second one. In this second part the pragmatism perception theory is compared to Aristotle's De Anima. Here is, in a general way, the argument: (1) perception is the result of nature's cause factors intrinsic to organism-environment transaction. (2) these factors cannot be encountered among revealed ontological elements of this same perception; therefore (3) the ontological structure revealed by perception doesn't reflect the totality of the organism-environment's transaction complexity. This conclusion is vital to understand the Aristotelian-pragmatic perception theory: the subject-on-world's transposition to world-on-subject phase, via "immaterial reception of forms"- establishment of the anteceptive field conscious of the action potentialities in such way. Pragmatism naturalism cleared up: the perception is a natural-historic evolved version of this same key-andlocker mechanism proper to form detection intrinsic of elementary ontological, biologic and even physical-chemical interactions. But instead of detection in the automatic nomological / biological action: conscious detection, opened, of free actions possibilities inserted in the percipient environment.