Supervaloracionismo e vaguidade
implicações epistemológicas e semânticas indesejáveis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2026v27i1:e74401Palabras clave:
Supervaloracionismo, Vaguidade, Conhecimento formal e das instâncias, Classicismo semântico e epistemológicoResumen
Tentaremos mostrar que a concepção supervaloracionista de tratamento da vaguidade apresenta implicações epistemológicas e semânticas indesejáveis, que, se tomadas em conjunto, mostram que ela é inadequada para um correto tratamento do fenômeno. As implicações de ordem epistemológica não são exatamente decisivas, mas estão longe de ser irrelevantes. Isso porque elas apontam para uma desvantagem importante do supervaloracionismo perante a concepção bivalente clássica. Por outro lado, as implicações semânticas indesejáveis nos parecem decisivas e recomendam o abandono da proposta supervaloracionista.
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