Quine’s critique of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions of existence
Keywords:
Carnap. Quine. Internal questions of existence. External questions of existence. Analytic-synthetic distinction.Abstract
This paper aims to make a brief reconstruction of Quine's critique of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions of existence, in order to clarify one of the points of divergence between the two authors. The first part of the paper, presents Carnap’s distinction (which is the object of Quine’s critique), which is a dichotomy between questions of existence made internally to a linguistic structure, and questions of existence made externally to a linguistic structure. The former questions are considered by the author as strictly theoretical , while the latter are considered as practical questions concerning the adoption of a language. The second part will expound on Quine’s critique, whose base is focused especially on the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction.References
BIRD, G. Carnap and Quine: internal and external questions. In: Erkenntnis, n. 42, p. 41-64, 1995.
CARNAP, R. Empirismo, Semântica e Ontologia. In: Coleção Os Pensadores. São Paulo: Editora Abril Cultural, 1975.
HYLTON, P. Quine. New York: Roudledge, 2007.
QUINE, W. On Carnap’s Views on Ontology. In: Philosophical Studies. n. 5, p. 65- 72, 1951.
______. Dois Dogmas do Empirismo. In: Os Pensadores: Ryle / Austin / Quine / Strawson. Trad. de Oswaldo Porchat Pereira da Silva e Andréa Maria Altino de Campos Lopairé. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1975.
______. Two dogmas in retrospect. In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy. v. 21, n.. 3, p. 265-274, 1991.
SEVERO, R. P. O princípio de não-contradição é revisável? In: Barbarói. Santa Cruz do Sul, n. 26, jan./jun. 2007.
