Belief: guiding principle for philosophical investigation
Keywords:
Belief. Action. Habit. Pragmatism.Abstract
In his critique of Cartesianism, Peirce not only rejects the possibility of reaching certainty by means of intuition, but also opposes the idea that absolute truth can be attained by any other means. Because we are irremediably fallible, our certainties are always provisional and subject to rectification. Thus any inquiry must start from what we take to be certain, i.e., from that which does not arouse doubts in us, namely, from our beliefs.References
ENGEL, Pascal. Belief as a disposition to act. In: Cognitio: revista de filosofia. São Paulo, v.6, n.2, 2005.
HAUSMAN, C.R. Peirce’s Evolutionary Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
HOOKWAY, Christopher. Peirce. London; New York: Routledge&Kegan, 1992.
PEIRCE, Charles Sanders. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. C. Hartshorne e P. Weiss (Eds.) v.1-6 e A. W. Burks (Ed.) v. 7-8. Cambridge: Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1931-1958. (aqui referido como C.P, seguido do número do volume e do número do parágrafo).
