Dando ao dualismo o que lhe é devido
Palavras-chave:
Dualismo de substância, materialismo, problema mente-corpoResumo
Apesar do ressurgimento atual de formas modestas de dualismo mente-corpo, o dualismo de substância-imaterial cartesiano tradicional tem poucos defensores, se é que tem algum. Este artigo defende que nenhum argumento convincente foi apresentado contra o dualismo de substância, e que as objeções standard a ele podem ser respondidas de forma credível.
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