The Belief Story: Peirce’s Anti-Kantian open Perspectives

Abstract

At the end of the past century, both hermeneutics and analytic philosophy entered a severe crisis, paving the way for a “pragmatic turn” that combined respectively a methodical pattern that avoided irrationalism or crude nihilism (Habermas), and an interpretative context that avoided the infinite analysis bereft of any meaningful, ideal horizon (Brandom, Marconi, Putnam). This paper tracks the crisis in a common Kantian background that has shown its insufficiency in many fields: hypothetical reasoning, creative processes, daily acts of trust, beliefs. Using Peirce’s insights, here I will try to explore beliefs because they have a peculiar rationale that classic philosophy, and a fortiori Kant’s critic and followers, have overlooked. As we are going to see Peirce’s view of belief stems from the continuity between reality and thought, and opens up a new understanding of reasoning, beyond the Kantian analytic-synthetic distinction.