The epistemological ostrich of the antiPoperian brain and the political-economic drama of the Anthropocene

Authors

  • Gustavo Rick Amaral Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, Faculty of Exact Sciences and Technology, Postgraduate Program in Intelligence Technologies and Digital Design, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23925/1984-3585.2021i24p139-156

Keywords:

Anthropocene, Anthropocentrism, Human rationality, Bounded rationality

Abstract

This short essay argues for a conception of Anthropocene as a historical condition that marks the decline of the anthropocentrism. Anthropocene is the historical condition in which we became aware of the distance between the idealized rationality that is essential to modern anthropocentrism and the more realistic version of our rationality that is emerging from contemporary empirical studies. In the last few decades, empirical studies in the field of cognitive science and experimental psychology have developed models of rationality that contrast with the more idealized versions of rationality that we have been cultivating since the enlightenment. This contrast is not new. It has been anticipated by Freud and the psychoanalytic tradition in Western culture. What is new is the accumulation of evidence that sustains a more descriptive (less normative) conceptualization of human reason. This more descriptive approach (based on experimental research) of how human reason is called bounded rationality and is the fundamental engine of the decline of the anthropocentrism in accordance with our conception of Anthropocene in this essay.

Author Biography

Gustavo Rick Amaral, Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, Faculty of Exact Sciences and Technology, Postgraduate Program in Intelligence Technologies and Digital Design, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil

PhD from the Postgraduate Studies Program in Intelligence Technologies and Digital Design (2014) at PUC/SP and Master's degree from the Postgraduate Studies Program in Communication and Semiotics (2009) also at PUC-SP. He is the author of the book "Can Science Advances End Philosophy?" in partnership with physicist Ronaldo Marin (published by Estação das Letras e Cores, 2020). He is a professor in the Social Communication courses at Anhembi-Morumbi University. He was coordinator of the Journalism course at Faculdade PAULUS de Tecnologia e Comunicação (FAPCOM) in the period 2015-2016. He was professor of the Social Communication course and of the Philosophy course at Faculdade PAULUS de Tecnologia e Comunicação (FAPCOM) in the period 2012-2016. He is a researcher at the International Center for Peircean Studies (CIEP/PUC-SP) and at the research group Transobjeto (dedicated to the study of the relationship between speculative realism and Peircean realism).

References

BERGER, Jonah; MEREDITH, Marc; WHEELER, S. Christian. Contextual priming: where people vote affects how they vote. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, v. 105 n. 26, p. 8846-49, 2008.

DESCARTES, René. O discurso do método. Tradução: J. Guinsburg e B. Prado Júnior. Col. Os Pensadores (volume XV). São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1973 [1637].

EVANS, Dylan. The third wound: Has psychology banished the ghost from the machine? Em: STUMP, J. B.; PADGETT, Alan G. (eds.). The Blackwell companion to Science and Christianity. Oxford: Blackwell, 2012

FREUD, Sigmund. A general introduction to psychoanalysis. Trans. G. Stanley Hall. New York, NY: Boni and Liverights, 1920.

HAACK, Susan. Descartes, Peirce and the cognitive community. The Monist, v. 65, n. 2, p. 166-71, 1982.

HASELTON, Martie G.; NETTLE, D. The paranoid optimist: an integrative evolutionary model of cognitive biases. Personality and Social Psychology Review, v. 10, n. 1, p. 47-66, 2006.

KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Thinking fast and slow. London: Penguin Books, 2011.

KAHNEMAN, Daniel; TVERSKY, Amos. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, v. 185, n. 4157, p. 1124-1131, 1974.

KAHNEMAN, Daniel; TVERSKY, Amos. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, v. 47, n. 2, p. 263-291, 1979.

MERCIER, Hugo; SPERBER, Dan. Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, v. 34, p. 57–111, 2011.

NICKERSON, Raymond S. Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, v. 2, n. 2, p.175-220, 1998.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. A Gaia Ciência. Tradução: Paulo César de Souza. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012 [1882].

PEIRCE, Charles Sanders. The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. v. 1-6, HARTSHORNE, Charles; WEISS, Paul (eds.); v. 7-8, BURKS, Arthur (ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-58.

RUTCHICK, Abraham M. Deus ex machina: the influence of polling place on voting behavior. Political Psychology, v. 31, n. 2 (April), p. 209-225, 2010.

SANTAELLA, Lucia. Estética: de Platão a Peirce. São Paulo. Ed. Experimento, 1994.

SIMON, Herbert. Models of bounded rationality, 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982.

THALER, Richard. Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, v. 1, p. 39-60, 1980.

THALER, Richard; SUNSTEIN, Cass R. Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.

TODOROV, Alexander, MANDISODZA, Anesu N., GOREN, Amir; Hall, Crystal C. Inference of competence from faces predict electoral outcomes. Science, v. 308, p. 1623–1626, 2005.

Published

2022-03-09